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Summary
This thesis is a guide to the eviction landscape in South Carolina, produced with three main
audiences in mind: organizers, researchers, and policymakers. It seeks to address three related
questions. First, where are evictions happening? How do they cluster geographically, and what
conclusions can we draw from these patterns? Second, who or what responsible for the crisis? What
are the main correlates, and how can geospatial statistics shed light on the issue? And finally, how
can the South Carolinian crisis be placed within the framework of radical geography and
understood in a wider context?

Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and analyze the South Carolinian eviction crisis from the
perspective of radical geography. South Carolina was chosen for the severity of its crisis and the
lack of research at a sub-state level. Court records of eviction filings from 2019 were geocoded and
tested for spatial clustering, which was clearly visible. Plaintiff names were used to identify the
most frequent filers and distinguish landlords by type. At the census tract level, eviction filing
counts were compared with neighborhood characteristics using negative binomial regression, and
most were found to be significant in South Carolina. To better capture spatial variation in how
eviction filings may be best explained, the paper introduces Geographically Weighted Regression
(GWR) to the field of eviction research. This novel approach is shown to be useful at identifying
the interactions between eviction and localized housing markets, although it was not established as
statistically stronger that linear regression. Finally, this report urges a reorientation of eviction
research towards the application of its findings.
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Introduction
“They will talk of giving compensation to the landlords, of preparing statistics,
and drawing up long reports. Yes, they would be capable of drawing up reports
long enough to outlast the hopes of the people.”
—Pyotr Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread, 1906

The eviction crisis is not new, but the intensity of scholarly attention to it is. Beginning with the
publication of Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City by Matthew Desmond, this
attention has focused on the understanding of eviction as a cause, not simply a result, of poverty
(2016). More than just a traumatic experience, eviction causes children to do worse in school,
parents to be at a higher risk of losing their jobs, and all family members to be more likely to
become involved with the criminal justice system (Hatch & Yun 2020). By 2021, the urgent need
for a solution had been made startlingly clear by the COVID-19 pandemic: a working paper from
the National Bureau of Economic Research found that stronger limits on eviction could have
resulted in a 40.7 percent reduction in COVID-19 deaths in the United States (Jowers et al. 2021).
It is hard to characterize the eviction crisis as anything less than “social murder” (Engels 2009).
But this crisis is not geographically uniform. In fact, the contrasts between regions, states, and
localities mean that it is necessary to confirm the applicability of findings to each local context.
Using radical geography as a framework, researchers can fit eviction into a larger story of twentyfirst century capitalism and displacement (Smith 2002).
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Background and Literature Review
Eviction is a defining feature of housing markets. As pointed out by Sims (2016), the very fact that
evictions are spatially concentrated is evidence that they are not simply the result of tenants’ failures
or bad decisions, but rather the result of external or systemic factors. It is part of the relationship
between tenants and landlords that can be traced back to feudalism (Schmidt 2017). The conflict
between landlords and peasants was initially chaotic and excessively violent, so successive English
kings sought to formalize and systematize the right of landlords to recover property “taken” by
tenants who failed to pay rent (Schmidt 2017). During the Industrial Revolution, this feudal
relationship was adapted to fit the commodification of housing (Engels 2009; Soederberg 2018).
Tenancy was reclassified as a contract between equal parties, but without addressing the underlying
power imbalance between landlord and renter, which remained the basic justification for eviction
(Schmidt 2017). To quote from Nelson, Garboden, et alia (2021):
“It is important to view eviction as a process reflecting a set of social relations,
rather than a singular… event. To imply otherwise would be to suggest that the
relationship between landlord and tenant is purely one of financial exchange and
not—as economic sociologists have described—an economically articulated,
institutionally mediated, social relationship.”
Today, eviction is the “stick” with which landlords extract rent, or failing that, harass, exploit, or
remove their tenants (Huq and Harwood 2019; Garboden and Rosen 2019; Balzarini and Boyd
2020). It is therefore essential to the functioning of the landlord-tenant relationship. Without
eviction, it would be impossible for landlords to harass, exploit, or remove their tenants, and
ultimately, impossible for them to continue to demand rent. Removal, however, is only the most
extreme possible outcome; landlords (especially in South Carolina) routinely file with an
expectation that the tenant will pay back their debts at some point before the case is resolved
(Garboden and Rosen 2019; Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020). The filing is meant to scare or
3

threaten tenants with the possibility of removal (Garboden and Rosen 2019; Moore 2020a; Leung,
Hepburn, and Desmond 2020), while simultaneously making such a move more difficult for the
tenant, since they will now have to find a landlord who will tolerate an eviction record (Kleysteuber
2007; Desmond 2012; Rosen 2014; Humphries et al. 2019; Porton, Desmond, and Gromis 2020).
This combines to create a powerful incentive for the tenant to pay back the rent and try to remain
in the home they still have (Garboden and Rosen 2019). As a bonus, landlords often use eviction
as an opportunity to impose late fees and bill tenants for court fees, adding an average of $180 on
top of rent (Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020; Moore 2020a). Marking tenants with a “Scarlet
E”, so to speak, serves a larger purpose beyond the immediate one of charging fees and collecting
rent (Desmond 2016). Tenants with a record form a captive market, allowing landlords to “milk”
deteriorating properties for high rents (Smith 1979; Desmond and Wilmers 2019; Teresa and
Howell 2020).
Because eviction is an outcome of housing market dynamics, researchers over the past decade have
made great progress in predicting eviction using neighborhood characteristics.1 These can broadly
be divided into population characteristics, housing characteristics, landlord characteristics, and the
legal environment (see Figure 6). Population characteristics have been the most widely studied, and
almost all studies in this area include some measure of race and income (e.g., Desmond 2012;
Medina et al. 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 2021). Other factors identified over the years include
children as a percent of the total population (Desmond et al. 2013; Goodspeed, Benton, and Slugg
2021), single-mother households as a percent of all households (Desmond 2012; Goodspeed,
Benton, and Slugg 2021), and several other metrics of concentrated disadvantage (Desmond and

1

Because of its documented use as a gentrification tactic (e.g., Huq and Harwood 2019; Mah 2020),
eviction’s relationship to gentrification on a neighborhood level has been an issue of longstanding scholarly
interest. While some researchers have found success with novel methods and/or redefined terms (Chum
2015; Laniyonu 2019), in general the relationship appears ambiguous at best and is most likely too
localized to be captured with areal units (Freeman 2005; Desmond 2012; Desmond and Gershenson 2017;
Lens et al. 2020; Mah 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 2021).
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Gershenson 2017; Lens et al. 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 2021). The central role of landlord
characteristics is beginning to be understood, as corporate property managers, large property
managers, and even subsidized housing contribute disproportionately to the crisis (Smith 2002;
Raymond et al. 2016, 2018; Huq and Harwood 2019; Immergluck et al. 2019; Balzarini and Boyd
2020; Teresa and Howell 2020; Lens et al. 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 2021). The effects of
housing characteristics appear to be more complex, since factors like median rent may have
nonlinear effects (Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020). But vacancy, low home values, and the
median year rental properties were built have all been shown to be significant (Desmond and
Gershenson 2017; Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020; Lens et al. 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al.
2021; Medina et al. 2021).
From a methodological standpoint, geospatial statistics have become an increasingly important part
of eviction research. The first law of geography is that “everything is usually related to all else but
those which are near to each other are more related when compared to those that are further away”
(Tobler 1970). A study that treats neighborhoods as isolated observations will miss a significant
part of the picture. Even research that does not explicitly incorporate geostatistical methods is
usually confined to the local or regional scale, as exemplified by the sources cited above. To some
extent, this has been a practical consideration—the collection of nationwide data is notoriously
difficult (Desmond et al. 2018). But most researchers have come to recognize the theoretical
problems involved in comparing areas with different legal procedures and recordkeeping practices
(Nelson, Garboden, et al. 2021). A few have gone further, taking the statistical methods developed
by geographers to account for spatial proximity. One method is to adjust for spatial autocorrelation,
meaning the clustering of similar dependent variables (Raymond et al. 2016; Medina et al. 2020).
Another method is to account for spillover effects, or the impact one place’s independent variables
have on neighboring places (Laniyonu 2019; Lens et al. 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 2021).
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Despite these strides that have been made towards modeling eviction, there are still major gaps in
our understanding. Different areas will have similar eviction rates for different reasons (Sims 2019).
Some attempts have been made to study how the correlates of eviction differ between housing
markets, but the process of delineating markets has been manual (Goodspeed et al. 2021). In this
paper, I introduce a geostatistical method that can automatically recognize and account for differing
local dynamics. Since being created by Brunsdon, Fotheringham, and Charlton in a 1996 paper,
Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) has been widely and effectively used in the field of
housing research (e.g., Bitter, Mulligan, and Dall’erba 2007; Borst and McCluskey 2008;
Manganelli et al. 2014). Rather than trying to predict the eviction count in all tracts using a model
fitted to the whole study area, GWR predicts each tract’s eviction count with a unique regression
equation that has been fitted using only nearby tracts. This makes identifying and accounting for
local housing market dynamics substantially easier. For example, in order to understand the
differing local importance of median rent visa-vis the eviction crisis, researchers could map the
coefficients for median rent that GWR generates for each local regression equation. Where the
magnitude of the coefficient is larger, median rent plays a bigger role in the regression model. Each
localized interaction between eviction and housing markets can be understood on its own terms,
without necessarily knowing the size or shape of the relevant housing markets in advance. In theory,
this will also lead to far more accurate predictions.
In addition to investigating the effectiveness of this technique when applied to eviction, this study
also applies more established techniques in the process of describing and analyzing South
Carolina’s eviction landscape. As mentioned, the variation in the factors contributing to the eviction
crisis is such that findings from one region may not be applicable to others (Nelson, Garboden, et
al. 2021). It is necessary, therefore, to validate the conclusions drawn from analyses of other states
by repeating those methodologies here. This will include a Getis-Ord Gi* Hot Spot analysis and a
negative binomial regression model (cf., Sims 2016; Medina et al. 2021; Leung, Hepburn, and
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Desmond 2020; Medina et al. 2020; Goodspeed, Benton, and Slugg 2021; Nelson, Gromis, et al.
20212). My goal in this endeavor is to help researchers, policymakers, and tenant organizers in
South Carolina understand the general landscape of eviction in the state and apply that knowledge
towards combating the crisis.

South Carolina’s Eviction Laws and Eviction Process
In 2016, Princeton’s Eviction Lab estimated the eviction rate as almost double that of the next
highest state (Desmond et al. 2018). The legal environment around eviction plays a crucial role in
explaining why South Carolina has such a high eviction rate overall. Although South Carolina is
classified as having a “contradictory” landlord-tenant legal environment in general (that is, having
some laws that favor tenants and others that favor landlords), research has shown that it is precisely
these states where eviction rates are the highest (Hatch 2017; Merritt and Farnworth 2020). The
exact reasons for this remain uncertain, but in South Carolina, it appears to be due to a combination
of lack of enforcement of pro-tenant laws and the fact that laws around eviction are almost
uniformly pro-landlord (see Table 1; Moore 2020b; Nelson, Garboden, et al. 2021). Lack of
enforcement of pro-tenant laws is a common problem stemming from the structure and culture of
eviction courts, arising as they did as a way of enforcing the property rights of landlords (Bezdek
1992; Schmidt 2017; Summers 2019). So-called “pro-tenant” laws are usually defensive, because
there is no equivalent to eviction for a tenant seeking to enforce their side of the contract. South
Carolina also has limited legal resources for tenants who wish to fight in court. South Carolina
Legal Services is the only statewide law firm that offers pro bono eviction defense.

2
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Only used negative binomial regression as a robustness check

Table 1: Comparison of Eviction Laws in South Carolina and Neighboring States
State
Time between
Filing
Cutoff to
Right to Time before
notice & filing
fee3
request hearing counsel
set-out4
5
6
South Carolina
5 days (see below)
$40
10 days
No
~6 days
7
North Carolina
10 days
$96
Automatic
No
10 days
8
Georgia
Immediate
~$50
7 days
No
7 days
9
Tennessee
14 days
~$175 Automatic
No
10 days
Alabama10
7 days
~$297 Varies
No
7 days
State
Does offering/repaying rent
Protection against
Minimum
stop the eviction process?
retaliation
total time11
South Carolina
Up to 5 days after due
Yes
26 days
North Carolina
No
Yes
32 days
Georgia
Up to 7 days after filing
Yes, as of July 2019
~20 days
Tennessee
Up to 14 days after due
Yes
36 days
Alabama
If accepted
Yes
~41 days
In South Carolina, the eviction process for nonpayment of rent (the most common reason for
eviction) begins when the landlord gives a tenant five days’ notice that they are behind (Figure 1).
However, a loophole in state law allows this notice to be bypassed if it is included in the lease.
After five days, the landlord may file with the local Magistrate Court for $40. The low filing fee
encourages repeat filings against the same tenant, a practice known as “serial” eviction (Garboden
and Rosen 2019; Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020; Nelson, Garboden, et al. 2021). The tenant

3

Unlike South Carolina, most states allow filing fees to be set at the local level, so their fees are listed as
approximate values (iPropertyManagement 2020)
4
The minimum time between the hearing and the tenant being removed (iPropertyManagement 2020)
5
S.C. Code Ann. § 27-37 and § 27-40
6
There is some local variation. Local eviction lawyers explained that Bluffton, Beaufort, Spartanburg, and
some courts in the Pee Dee area all schedule hearings automatically.
7
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25
8
Ga. Code Ann. §§ 44-7
9
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 66-28
10
Ala. Code § 35-9A
11
iPropertyManagement 2020

8

then has ten days to vacate or “show cause”, i.e., request the court for a hearing. In most courts, if
the tenant does not respond the landlord can simply request a writ of ejectment. A large portion of
cases are settled or dismissed before the hearing. The parties often come to some sort of agreement
or mutually stop pursuing the case. But landlords in South Carolina will sometimes go to court
even if an agreement has been reached, just to keep the option of eviction open (Leung, Hepburn,
and Desmond 2020). If both parties appear before the judge, generally the plaintiff is successful.
The judge may rule for the defendant if there are extenuating circumstances, dismiss if the plaintiff
stops pursuing the case, or sanction a settlement. Any of these recorded outcomes can obscure
special conditions, agreements, or other details not in the record of the case (Table 2).
Figure 1: The (Simplified) Eviction Process in South Carolina

Pre-eviction

Notice

Filing

Application
for Ejectment

Pre-hearing
Disposition

Defendant
does not
respond

Defendant
responds

Court Summons

Hearing
Scheduled

Dismissed

Dismissed

Find for
Plaintiff

Settled

Find for
Defendant

Settled

Default
Judgement

Issuance of Writ

Writ of
Ejectment

Writ of
Ejectment

Execution of Writ

Set-out

Set-out

South Carolina does not have separate housing courts. Instead, eviction cases are heard in
Magistrate Courts, usually as a bench trial. Parties can request a jury trial, but this study found that
that was rarely done (less than 200 recorded instances in the past five years). A pro-landlord court
9

culture is encouraged by the tradition of allowing local power-brokers (state senators) to
recommend candidates for Magistrate to the Governor. It is exacerbated by the fact that the Court
Bench Book does not require Magistrates to have a law degree or any background in landlordtenant law. Corruption is rampant, judges are almost never removed for disciplinary infractions
(Cranney 2019). For decades, Magistrates routinely set unlawfully high bonds for appeal due to a
misinterpretation (whether deliberate or otherwise) of the statute on civil appeals until an order
from the South Carolina Supreme Court halted the practice in 2020 (Moore 2020b, 2020c). South
Carolina’s habitability protections are rarely applied, in part due to their byzantine specifications.
Tenants can pay for essential services and deduct the cost from rent if the landlord fails to provide
them—but they cannot make repairs and deduct (S.C. Code Ann. § 27-40-630). The court requires
a level of documentation that is essentially unachievable for most tenants. In recognition of this,
eviction lawyers in South Carolina generally advise tenants not to utilize even the limited rights
they do have to withhold rent. Overall, the court records show that tenants won less than one out
of every ten cases settled by the Magistrate over the last five years.
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Data and Descriptive Statistics
Eviction data for the years 2015-2020 was requested from the South Carolina Court Administration,
which compiled records from the 319 Magistrate Courts that hear eviction cases around the state.
A total of 801,202 records were received. Cases were removed if they lacked both a disposition
and filing date or if the case status or disposition was marked as “transferred”, “rescheduled”,
“void”, or “clearance”. This totaled to 5,382 cases (0.67% of cases) that were removed. Additional
code was used to remove common typos, format the data in a usable way, and generate standardized
fields.
The standardized date was either the filing date, or if that was unavailable, the disposition date.
Standardized property ownership, ownership type, and property name fields were parsed from the
plaintiff’s name. Commonly, the plaintiff column contained the name of the plaintiff “DBA”
(“doing business as”) the apartment complex. For Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)
properties, public housing, and the largest private managers, an effort was made to identify and
associate properties with the correct manager using apartment names and addresses. This was done
using the free and open-source software OpenRefine. OpenRefine also helped identify and merge
name variations or misspellings (e.g., “Chase E. Furnas, Co” and “Chase Furnas, Co”). The
“plaintiff name” column was then split into property name and property owner columns. The
Python library “cleanco” was used to help standardize property owner names. Ownership type was
determined by first checking if the field “Plaintiff First” (i.e., first name) was filled. If it was, the
filer was assumed to have been an individual. Then, any case where the property owner had
“authority” in the name was marked as public housing12, and any case where the property name
and property owner fields matched the list of LIHTC properties and owners was marked as such

12

Units owned by public housing authorities were marked as having been filed by the appropriate
authority, even if a professional management company had been used.
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(these had been ensured to match by careful manual cleaning in OpenRefine). Finally, the
remaining cases were marked as being from corporate filers.
The defendant’s address was parsed using the Python library “usaddress”, and if a street address
(as opposed to a PO box) was identified, it became the standardized address. If a street address
could not be located or did not exist, the Magistrate court’s street address was used. This was done
for 8,001 cases (1% of geocoded cases). To ensure that using court addresses for these cases did
not distort the geographic distribution of the data, the hotspot analysis was conducted both with
and without them, and results were nearly identical. Cases were geocoded using their standardized
addresses, and 1,130 (0.14% of the total) were removed because the address was geocoded to a
location outside of South Carolina or could not be located on the map. 794,690 cases were correctly
geocoded. These cases were then aggregated into census tracts and block groups so that they could
be compared with neighborhood characteristics. Tracts and block groups are two ways that the US
Census divides the map of the country to efficiently collect and publish demographic data. Tracts
are slightly larger, usually composed of about 4,000 people. Block groups are subdivisions of tracts,
with populations of between 600 and 3,000 people. The analysis was performed at both levels to
check for robustness, and the results were comparable. The final geographically weighted model
performed slightly better at the tract level because margins of error for ACS data are lower, and
more data (such as data from the Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy) was available.
For that reason, this paper presents the tract-level analysis. Of the 1,103 census tracts in South
Carolina, six unpopulated tracts were excluded from the analysis.
This paper looks at eviction filings rather than evictions. Court records do not accurately show
whether a set-out (i.e., an eviction) has occurred (Table 2). The closest approximation offered is
that a “writ of ejectment” has been issued (Porton, Desmond, and Gromis 2020; Raymond et al.
2016). Although all set-outs require a writ of ejectment to be issued first, it is very uncertain what
portion of writs are ever executed. Local eviction lawyers and nonprofit representatives have
12

explained that until recently, many rental assistance programs in Greenville required tenants to
show a writ of ejectment before they could qualify. Similar situations may or may not exist in other
counties, but journalists have reported that some landlords in South Carolina repeatedly seek writs
against the same tenant without executing any of them (Moore 2020a). Filing an eviction is so
cheap in South Carolina that landlords seem to find it more profitable to use the extra writs as an
arm-twisting tactic, rather than go through the hassle of turning over the unit. This makes the
number of writs issued a poor approximation of evictions.
Table 2: Potential outcomes of landlord-tenant disputes
Result
Definition
Recorded Outcome
No displacement (or
The tenant stays in the property (or
Any, or no, recorded outcome
no court-enforced
leaves for some other reason)
is possible
displacement)
Court-enforced
The tenant leaves the property to
Any recorded outcome is
displacement
avoid a hearing, expecting to be set possible. Also includes preout, or to end harassment in the
filing settlements where the
form of repeated filings
tenant agrees to vacate the
property
Set-out/eviction
The tenant is removed by the sheriff A variable subset of cases
marked “find for plaintiff”,
“default judgment”, or “writ of
ejectment issued”

Other factors complicate the issue still further. As scholars have noted, many instances of courtenforced displacement occur without a writ ever being issued (Desmond and Shollenberger 2015;
Desmond 2016; Nelson, Garboden, et al. 2021). Although the strictest definitions would not include
these as “evictions”, the outcome is essentially the same in terms of harm done to the tenant,
especially in a state like South Carolina where all eviction filings are public record. And there is
no official process for expungement. For these reasons, the count of eviction filings was deemed
the most accurate and meaningful statistic that can be calculated with existing court records.
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Figure 2: Eviction Filings in South Carolina (Jan 2015-Oct 2020)
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Figure 2 shows that the raw number of eviction filings has increased by around 7,000 over the past
5 years, but the filing rate has remained steady at about 25 percent.13 If an upward trend does exist,
it is very slight. As previously noted, this analysis will focus on 2019. All following graphs, figures,
maps, and charts will refer to 2019 data unless otherwise noted.
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For the years of 2015 and 2016, these figures are inconsistent with those reported by the Princeton
Eviction Lab (Desmond et al. 2018). This is due to differences in our data cleaning methods (see limitations
for more details).
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Figure 3: Histogram of Census Tracts by Filing Count, 2019
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Using the filing count rather than filing rate made it possible to include tracts with very few
estimated renter households. Descriptive statistics were calculated using the Data Analysis Toolpak
in Excel. The results (Figure 3 and Table 3) indicate that eviction filings are right-skewed (the
modal bin is 25-50 and the mean tract has a filing rate of 136.6). Sample variance is very high due
to the wide range of possible filing counts. A not insignificant number of tracts contain over 500
filings. This distribution has implications for the regression analyses later in this paper, since many
regression models (e.g., ordinary least squares) assume a normally distributed data set.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Filing Count by Census Tract, 2019
Mean
136.6
Median
76
Standard Error
5.3
Standard Deviation
175
Sample Variance
30648
Kurtosis
11
Skewness
3
Minimum
0
Maximum
1305
Total Eviction Filings
149849
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Evictors
The growing importance of state action in displacement, and the influx of investor-owned rental
properties following the collapse of the housing bubble in 2008, means that it is important to take
a survey of exactly what actors are causing the eviction crisis (Smith 2002; Raymond et al. 2016,
2018). Using the methods described above, plaintiffs were sorted into four broad categories:
individuals (i.e., those filing under a person’s name), public housing authorities (whether filed
under the name of the authority itself, a project, or a contracted management company), and
LIHTC properties (carefully cross-referenced with a list provided by the South Carolina Housing
Finance Authority).
Figure 4: Types of Filers (Jan 2015-Oct 2020)

6%

4%

22%

67%

Corporations

Individuals

LIHTC

Public Housing

Consistently with previous research, Figure 4 shows that corporate property managers file the vast
majority of cases in South Carolina. Individual filers often own fewer properties, cannot afford
vacancies, and prefer to reach an extrajudicial settlement rather than file an eviction (Balzarini and
Boyd 2020). Large, corporate managers file more evictions because they can afford to handle
16

vacancies (Garboden and Rosen 2019). These managers claim to avoid out-of-court settlements
because they are afraid of discrimination lawsuits, although research has yet to show whether this
is a rationalization (Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020). While subsidized housing makes up
nearly 20 percent of all occupied rental units, it only accounts for around 10 percent of eviction
filings (Grady 2021). Although this might seem to imply that subsidized housing plays reduced
role in the crisis, we should be cautious about drawing this conclusion. For one, figures are not
available on the number of units managed by other types of landlords, so it may be possible that
subsidized housing is only less prolific compared to corporate filers, but more prolific than
individuals. Moreover, this does not preclude individual LIHTC properties or public housing
authorities from playing an outsized role in the crisis.
Table 4: Top 15 Evictors (Jan 2015-Oct 2020)
Property Manager
Type
Total Eviction Filings
Powers Properties
Private
23,192
InterMark Management
Private
14,621
Asset Management and Consulting Services (AMCS)
Private
9,786
Yes! Communities
Private
9,136
Southwood Realty
Private
8,902
Boyd Management
Private
7,225
Charleston Housing Authority
Public
6,496
DBC Real Estate Management
Private
5,737
First Communities Management
Private
4,415
Mid-America Apartment Communities
Private
4,085
Columbia Housing Authority
Public
4,000
Carroll Companies
Private
3,861
Roland Management
Private
3,567
Darby Development
Private
3,401
Gaffney Housing Authority
Public
2,924
Burlington Capital
Private
2,903
Morgan Properties
Private
2,703
Strategic Management Partners
Private
2,678
Stonemark Management
Private
2,640
NHE
Private
2,604
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Table 4 shows the entities that have filed the most evictions over the past five years. Three of the
top fifteen were public housing authorities (Local Housing Authorities or LHAs), demonstrating
that individual LHAs are major contributors to the crisis. In 2019, the Gaffney Housing Authority
filed 655 evictions on only 274 units—a rate of 239 percent. Very few of these cases (64) had the
outcome “find for plaintiff”, suggesting that the authority is using eviction as a rent collection
method, much like private corporations do. Previous researchers working in South Carolina’s
upstate have catalogued the class, racial, and gendered tensions between white male LHA officials
and black female tenants, which are similar to tensions in the private market (Neary 2011; cf.
Desmond 2016; Bezdek 1992). Moreover, LHAs often contract out management of their properties
to the same corporations used by private landlords, like NHE management in Greenville (TGHA
2021). The same is true for LIHTC properties: InterMark Management’s webpage boasts that “Low
Income Housing Tax Credit apartments [make] up approximately one-half of InterMark’s current
portfolio” (InterMark 2021). Neither public or privately owned subsidized units are immune to
eviction, and they may even be leaders in producing this crisis.
Some of these prolific evictors, such as Powers Properties, have been made notorious by the efforts
of local media (Editorial Board 2020; Moore 2020a; Weissman, Smolcic Larson, and Norkol 2020;
Weissman 2020). But most fly under the radar, filing hundreds or thousands of evictions each year
without public scrutiny. Policymakers and tenant organizers have an opportunity to make a major
impact on the overall crisis by targeting these top fifteen filers, which were responsible for 15.7
percent of all evictions filed over the past five years in South Carolina. The top fifty filed 22.8
percent, more than every individual put together. Local housing authorities and HUD should
identify where public housing managers are using eviction as a rent collection tactic, and either
change management companies or instruct them to change their practices. The South Carolina
Housing Finance Authority can deny future LIHTC funds to property managers who are
particularly prone to evicting their tenants and retroactively enact restrictions on current LIHTC
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managers to stop excessive use of eviction. For organizers, these companies represent particularly
important targets. Not only do they disproportionately afflict the lives of tenants, but residents in
their properties might be especially inclined to fight back.

Hot Spot Analysis
To visualize the data, the eviction filing rate (filings per 100 renter households) was calculated.
The estimate of renter households came from the ACS 5-year estimates for 2015-2019. If a tract
had no rental housing units recorded, the filing rate was considered null. Twenty census tracts had
a null filing rate (1.81% of the total). A hot spot analysis was then run using the namesake tool in
ArcGIS Pro. A hot spot analysis identifies tracts which are part of clusters: tracts with above- or
below-average filing rates surrounded by other tracts with similar rates. The null hypothesis is that
high and low filing rates are randomly distributed, but if enough similar tracts are concentrated in
a defined area, it will show up as a hot or cold spot (depending on whether the clustered values are
low or high). For this map, that defined area was the twenty-three nearest tracts to any given tract.
This definition yielded the highest overall Getis-Ord Gi* statistic, which represents the overall
statistical significance of the map. These clusters in Figure 5 are statistically significant and are
probably the result of spatial variables.
There are eight distinct hot spot areas and four major cold spot areas. The hot spots are Sumter,
Florence, North Charleston, Rock Hill, Gaffney, Spartanburg, south Greenville, and select suburbs
of Columbia. The four cold spots are the coastal plain, downtown Columbia, the area west of Lake
Murray, and the area around Lake Keowee. Other stray cold spots are scattered throughout the rural
areas of the state.
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Figure 5: Getis-Ord Gi* Hot Spot Map of Eviction Filing Rates, 2019

By consulting housing literature, we can begin to guess at the reasons for these clusters. For
example, the cold spot along the coast may be related to the high cost of housing, itself the result
of geographic constraints on housing (Allen and Lu 2003; Saiz 2010). Working class housing has
been pushed inland. While the housing quality there is low, it is mostly single-family homes rented
out on a small scale (Cutter, Mitchell, and Scott 2000; Cline 2017). Corporate property managers
have only just begun to penetrate the single-family rental market, and it does not appear that the
South Carolina inland coastal plain has been a primary target (Raymond et al. 2016, 2018; see
Appendix, Figure 21). The possibility of a relationship between eviction and heirs’ property—a
unique feature of the Lowcountry’s housing market—is intriguing but as-of-yet unclear. Heirs’
property is the common property of two or more heirs created when the original owner died without
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a will. It usually refers to a dwindling set of properties owned by the descendants of slaves who
were able to accumulate this land during the decades following abolition. No comprehensive survey
of heirs’ property exists, so it is difficult to analyze its relationship to eviction at the statewide scale
(Finewood 2012; Grabbatin 2016; Kuris 2018). The one hot spot near the coast is in North
Charleston. This is where working-class housing in the Charleston metro clusters, and where
multifamily and corporate-owned housing is the rule (see Appendix, Figures 16 and 21).
Both Greenville and Columbia have partial “rings” of hot spots formed by high-evicting suburbs.
This reflects the extremely suburban-centric growth in South Carolina since the 1960s and the
nationwide trend towards the suburbanization of poverty (Allen and Lu 2003; Kneebone and Garr
2010). As a larger percentage of the population has come to reside in suburbs, these areas are no
longer the exclusive purview of the upper or middle classes. The working class and poor live in
suburbs too, although these are often segregated into separate neighborhoods (Kneebone and Garr
2010). The suburbanization of poverty, it seems, has been followed by the suburbanization of
eviction. Elsewhere in the state, it is not immediately clear why some cities are hot spots while
others are not. Notably missing from this map are cities like Orangeburg and North Augusta, which
share many economic and geographical similarities with Sumter and Rock Hill respectively, both
of which are hot spots. While spatial difference in eviction is obviously present, further analysis is
required to determine the exact explanations for it.
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Independent Variables
Figure 6: Theoretical Model

Population
Characteristics

Landlord
Characteristics

Housing
Characteristics

Eviction
Filings

Legal
Environment
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This paper will test whether it is possible to explain these trends by a combination of three out of
the four factor-clusters found in past eviction research (Figure 6). Housing characteristics,
population characteristics, and landlord characteristics are all included, but for reasons explained
below, the legal environment was not operationalized in this study.
The class struggle between landlord and tenant most often comes to a head over housing
characteristics such as rent and habitability (Bezdek 1992; Desmond 2016). Population
characteristics, like median income and race, generally indicate areas of concentrated disadvantage
where evictions are clustered (Desmond 2016; Soederberg 2018; Desmond and Wilmers 2019;
Medina et al. 2020; Merritt and Farnworth 2020; Lens et al. 2020; Nelson, Gromis, et al. 2021).
Not only are residents of such neighborhoods more at risk of falling behind or facing
discrimination, but eviction itself helps reproduce their systems of poverty and exploitation
(Desmond 2012; Rosen 2014; Desmond and Shollenberger 2015; Desmond 2016; Sims 2019;
Teresa and Howell 2020). Landlord characteristics refer to features like number of properties
owned, ownership structure, or whether the landlord is part of a subsidized housing program.
Larger, bureaucratized landlords have the ability and the will to use eviction more often and more
universally (Raymond et al. 2016, 2018; Garboden and Rosen 2019; Huq and Harwood 2019;
Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020). As discussed, the legal environment can have a huge impact
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on whether a landlord thinks it is profitable to file a case, thus influencing the number of filings
(Merritt and Farnworth 2020; Nelson, Garboden, et al. 2021).
All four factor-clusters interact internally and with one another. In particular, landlords have the
ability to shape housing and population characteristics in the direction that is most profitable to
them (Rosen 2014; Teresa and Howell 2020). They set rent, maintain, or neglect the property, and
can even influence what sorts of properties are built through their collective demand. In turn,
housing characteristics such as age and property value influence what types of landlords want to
purchase and operate the property (Smith 1979). Population characteristics (especially those related
to housing market strength) influence the kind of landlords who operate in a given area. For
example, corporate property managers are more likely to locate in cities and are only a marginal
part of rural housing markets (see Appendix, Figure 21). The legal environment is influenced by
the relative political power of landlords and renters, which in turn is influenced by population
characteristics.
The legal environment was not operationalized in this analysis for theoretical and practical reasons.
The theoretical reason is that South Carolina does not have as much eviction policy variation at a
local level compared to other states. The filing fee is set by the state legislature and no localities
have major eviction diversion programs. From a practical perspective, local differences that do
exist are not well-documented and their significance is not yet attested to. Future research will
hopefully yield better data on the differences between Magistrates’ courts.
Table 5 lists the 26 variables used to operationalize the three other factor clusters. These variables
were chosen based on those shown to be significant in previous research. For some concepts, like
income, multiple variables were tested to determine the best possible operationalization. Those that
were removed before the final analysis are marked. Most are drawn from the American Community
Survey (ACS) five year estimates for 2015-2019. The 5-year estimates were used rather than the
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1-year estimates because neighborhoods change very slowly, so lower margins of error were
deemed more important than temporal precision. The habitability issues variable and the variables
related to area median income (AMI) came from the Comprehensive Housing Affordability
Strategy dataset for 2013-2017. A dummy variable for urbanity was generated based on whether a
tract intersected with a census-defined city. Landlord characteristics were operationalized using the
plaintiff’s name field in the court records. This field helped to determine the “ownership type” for
each case, classified as either individual, LIHTC, public housing, or corporation. The percentage
of all evictions filed by each type of landlord was calculated for each census tract. In general, these
variables can be treated as a proxy for the breakup of the rental market, but in exact terms they
represent the portion of the eviction crisis that a particular type of landlord is responsible for in that
tract.
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Variable
Urban

Median home value
Median rent
Median year built

Percent multifamily units
Percent manufactured units
Percent habitability issues

Vacancy rate
Seasonal vacancy rate
Percent evictions filed by
corporations
Percent evictions filed by
individuals
Percent evictions by LIHTC

Percent evictions filed by
public housing
Total renter households
Density
Percent single-mother
households
Percent population black
Percent population Hispanic
Percent population under 18
Percent population 25+ with
bachelor’s degree
Percent population 25+
without high school diploma
Poverty rate
Percent extremely low
income
Percent very low income

Percent low income

Median income
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Table 5: Independent Variables
Source
Description
Census Bureau’s
Dummy variable, tracts that
MAF/TIGER geographic
intersect with census-defined
database, 2019
cities marked as “1”
ACS 2015-2019, B25075
Median property value
ACS 2015-2019, B25064
Median gross rent
ACS 2015-2019, B25037
Median year that rental units
(B25036 as supplement)
were built, or all housing units if
former unavailable
ACS 2015-2019, B25024
Multifamily units divided by all
occupied units
ACS 2015-2019, B25024
Mobile home units divided by
all occupied units
CHAS 2013-2017, table 11
Households with at least one of
estimate 46
the housing problems recorded
by CHAS divided by all
occupied units
ACS 2015-2019, B25002
Vacate units divided by all units
ACS 2015-2019, B25004
Seasonally vacate units divided
by all units
South Carolina Judicial
Evictions filed by corporations
Branch Court Administration
divided by all evictions filed
(SCJBCA)
SCJBCA
Evictions filed by individuals
divided by all evictions filed
SCJBCA, LIHTC records
Evictions filed by LIHTC
from the South Carolina
properties divided by all
housing Finance Authority
evictions filed
SCJBCA, public housing
Evictions filed by public housing
records from HUD
divided by all evictions filed
ACS 2015-2019, B25003
Occupied rental units
ACS 2015-2019, B01003
Population divided by area
ACS 2015-2019, B11001
Households with female
householder, no husband present
divided by all households
ACS 2015-2019, B02009
Black population divided by
total population
ACS 2015-2019, B03002
Latino/Hispanic population
divided by total population
ACS 2015-2019, B01001
Individuals under 18 divided by
total population
ACS 2015-2019, B15003
Adults over 25 with a bachelor's
or higher divided by adults over
25
ACS 2015-2019, B15003
Adults over 25 without a high
school diploma divided by adults
over 25
ACS 2015-2019, B17002
Individuals below the poverty
line divided by total population
CHAS 2013-2017, table 7
Renter households below 30%
estimate 134
Area Median Income (AMI)
divided by renter households
CHAS 2013-2017, table 7
Renter households below 50%
estimates 134 and 160
AMI divided by renter
households
CHAS 2013-2017, table 7
Renter households below 80%
estimates 134, 160, and 186
AMI divided by renter
households
ACS 2015-2019, B19013
Median household income in the
past 12 months

Included in Regression?
Excluded from GWR analysis
because dummy variables
disallowed.

Excluded from regression due
to multicollinearity

Excluded from regression due
to multicollinearity

Excluded from regression due
to multicollinearity
Excluded from regression due
to multicollinearity

Correlational Analysis
The first round of analysis examined the correlation between each of the 26 variables and the filing
count. Correlational analysis is important because it allows us to understand these relationships
separately from one another. The independent variables were standardized by z-score to make the
outputs easier to interpret.
Table 6: Correlational Analysis Results
Independent Variable
Pearson’s Coefficient
Urban
Median home value
Median rent
Median year built
Percent multifamily units
Percent manufactured units
Percent habitability issues
Vacancy rate
Seasonal vacancy rate
Percent evictions filed by corporations
Percent evictions filed by individuals
Percent evictions filed by LIHTC
Percent evictions filed by public housing
Total renter households
Density
Percent single-mother households
Percent population black
Percent population Hispanic
Percent population under 18
Percent population 25+ without high school diploma
Percent population 25+ with bachelor’s degree
Poverty rate
Percent extremely low income
Percent very low income
Percent low income
Median income
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05
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—
—

—
—
—
—

—

—
—
—

Level of
Significance
0.2712
***
0.1256
***
0.0042
0.0927
**
0.4269
***
0.2018
***
0.1370
***
0.1238
***
0.2420
***
0.4159
***
0.4658
***
0.1382
***
0.0693
*
0.7246
***
0.2353
***
0.3151
***
0.3090
***
0.1796
***
0.1800
***
0.0883
**
0.0834
**
0.1905
***
0.0314
0.0783
**
0.1631
***
0.1910
***

Almost all of the variables tested (24 out of 26) were shown to have a statistically significant
correlation with eviction filings (Table 6). Of these, 19 were significant at the p < .001 level. The
correlational analysis confirms the relationships that have been found in previous research, with a
few notable exceptions. Important positive factors include the number of renter households, percent
black, and urbanity. Important negative factors are fewer in number but include seasonal vacancy
and median income. The correlational analysis confirms that landlord characteristics as
operationalized are significant correlates of eviction filings—individuals are less likely to evict
than corporations. The effect of subsidized housing is smaller, but still positive. It appears that
evictions are more common in neighborhoods with a high portion of multifamily housing as
opposed to neighborhoods with more manufactured housing. The statistical insignificance of
median rent is the result of a nonlinear relationship with eviction filings. As can be seen in Figure
7, the highest number of filings actually occur at middling rents. This is a phenomenon previously
observed by Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond (2020) when they examined the relationship between
serial filing rate and median rent on a nationwide level. One possible explanation is that tenants in
mid-range rental markets are able to struggle on for more months than the poorest renters, who will
be removed after a single missed payment (Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020).
Figure 7: Linear vs Polynomial Regression of Median Rent and Eviction Filings
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For the other insignificant variable, percent extremely low income, adding another term does not
improve the analysis by nearly as much (Figure 8). Visually, it is hard to identify any relationship
between extremely low income and filings except among outlying tracts, where it is negative.
Figure 8: Linear vs Polynomial Regression of % Extremely Low Income and Eviction
Filings
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Figure 11 (see Appendix) is a comprehensive list of the other variables graphed against filings.
With the exception of median rent and percent of the population 25+ with a bachelor’s degree, there
was no significant improvement to the model by adding a second term. For this reason, it was not
judged important to account for nonlinearity in this paper.
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Linear Regression
The second stage of the analysis was to model eviction filings using negative binomial regression
(NBNR). The most common linear regression model is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS); however,
NBNR is better suited to count data where the variance is greater than the mean, as it is in this
dataset. NBNR corrects for this overdispersion in part by taking the log of the dependent variable.
As noted, several variables were expected to be collinear with one another. To identify
multicollinearity, the R package “car” was used to calculate Variable Inflation Factors (VIF).
Multicollinearity occurs when one of the independent variables can be explained with some
combination of the other independent variables. If a variable is significantly collinear with other
variables, it should be removed for parsimony and to maintain the integrity of the regression model.
A VIF greater than 4 is considered marginally or highly collinear (see Table 7). To minimize
multicollinearity, the least significant variable of any multicollinear group was eliminated first. For
example, the two education variables were collinear, so percent without a high school diploma was
removed because it was less significant in the regression analysis. This method led me to remove
(in stages) the percent evictions filed by individuals, percent population 25+ without high school
diploma, percent extremely low income, percent very low income, and median income. Once these
variables had been removed, multicollinearity disappeared.
Table 7: VIF Test for Multicollinearity
Percent evictions filed by corporations
Percent evictions filed by individuals
Percent evictions filed by LIHTC
Percent evictions filed by public housing
Percent very low income
Median income
Percent extremely low income
Percent low income
Percent population 25+ with bachelor’s degree
Percent population 25+ without high school diploma
Percent single-mother households
Percent multifamily units
Poverty rate
Median home value
Percent population black
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2296.7
2175.6
420.3
328.5
12.3
7.6
6.3
6.0
5.9
3.8
3.7
3.6
3.6
3.5
2.9

Percent mobile units
Median rent
Total renter households
Density
Vacancy rate
Percent population under 18
Percent habitability issues
Seasonal vacancy rate
Percent population Hispanic
Urban
Median year built

2.9
2.3
2.2
2.1
2.1
2.0
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.4
1.2

The R package “MASS” was used to fit the NBNR equation and “MuMIn” was used to calculate
the corrected Akaike Information Criterion (AICc); the overall results can be seen in Table 8. It
should be noted that NBNR does not create an exact equivalent for the R2 generated with OLS
regression. The closest approximation is the percentage of the null deviance explained by the
model, in this case .782 or 78.2 percent. In order to compare with the GWR model, AICc will be
used. AICc is a statistic used to compare models’ “efficiency” at predicting the true values. It
prefers more accurate models that use fewer variables.
Table 8: Negative Binomial Regression Overall Results
Null deviance
5453.4 on 1096 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance
1190.3 on 1075 degrees of freedom
AICc
11192
Theta
3.790
Standard Error
0.173
2 x log-likelihood
-11144
Number of observations
1097
Out of twenty-one variables in the model, sixteen were significant at the 95 percent confidence
level (see Table 9). Of these, percent of the population 25+ with a bachelor’s degree, poverty rate,
percent low income, percent Hispanic, seasonal vacancy rate, and median rent were negatively
associated with filings. Urbanity, the median year built, percent manufactured units, percent filed
by corporations, percent filed by LIHTC, percent filed by public housing, percent with habitability
issues, total renter households, density, and percent under 18 had positive coefficients. The
variables have been standardized by z-score, so the coefficients indicate the effect of a one standard
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deviation change in the independent variable on the logs of the predicted eviction filing counts,
while other variables are held constant. Surprisingly, the coefficient of the percent of evictions filed
by corporations was larger than the coefficient for the number of renter households. The latter
relationship was still statistically stronger (see z-scores), but this speaks to the importance of
landlord characteristics. In fact, considering the strong significance of percent filed by the two
forms of subsidized housing as well, landlord characteristics in this study were by far the strongest
of the four factor-clusters.
Table 9: Negative Binomial Regression Variable Results
Variable
Coefficient Standard
Z value Significance
Error
Urban
0.0899
0.0387
2.32
*
Median home value
—
0.0418
0.0313
-1.34
Median rent
—
0.0641
0.0224
-2.85
**
Median year built
0.0149
0.0017
8.80
***
Percent multifamily units
—
0.0295
0.0295
-1.00
Percent manufactured units
0.1091
0.0269
4.07
***
Percent habitability issues
0.1414
0.0233
6.06
***
Vacancy rate
0.0334
0.0246
1.36
Seasonal vacancy rate
—
0.1254
0.0215
-5.85
***
Percent filed by corporations
0.5671
0.0261
21.70
***
Percent filed by LIHTC
0.2261
0.0184
12.30
***
Percent filed by public housing
0.2340
0.0189
12.35
***
Total renter households
0.5649
0.0230
24.56
***
Density
0.0498
0.0238
2.10
*
Percent single-mother households
0.0573
0.0313
1.83
Percent population black
0.0266
0.0270
0.99
Percent population Hispanic
—
0.0445
0.0187
-2.39
*
Percent population under 18
0.1311
0.0229
5.72
***
Percent population 25+ with
—
0.2759
0.0338
-8.17
***
bachelor’s degree
Poverty rate
—
0.1202
0.0262
-4.60
***
Percent low income
—
0.0985
0.0274
-3.59
***
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05
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Discussion
These results can help us understand the hot and cold spots identified above. The concentration of
hot spots in cities and suburbs is associated with the comparable concentration of corporate
managers there (see Appendix, Figure 21). Corporate managers naturally operate most in the areas
with the highest demand for rental housing and thus the largest properties and highest profit
margins. Urbanity and density also have independent positive effects, indicating that even noncorporate landlords are more likely to file in cities, where they can expect to fill vacancies more
quickly. The other landlord characteristics variables, percent filed by public housing and percent
filed by LIHTC, are also significant and positive. As seen in the analysis of evictor types, subsidized
housing does not insulate renters from eviction. The overall importance of landlord characteristics
emphasizes the importance of landlord choice in filing evictions. It should direct the attention of
policymakers to better regulating large corporate filers.
High seasonal vacancy rates (see Appendix, Figure 20), such as in coastal markets or near Lakes
Keowee and Murray, are associated with fewer filings. This may be related to the predominance of
vacation rentals in those areas, although it is unclear why this would decrease the total number of
filings rather than just the filing rate. Potentially, seasonal vacancy is acting as a proxy for an
unknown causal variable related to vacation areas. If rental housing is being marketed to
vacationers, for example, it may push working-class renters to commute in from elsewhere. In the
Charleston metro, the hot spot in North Charleston appears to justify this explanation. In other
coastal areas, commuters may live in more rural areas, where eviction filings may be suppressed
for other reasons (like less concentrated demand). That said, these are still hypotheses that require
more research to investigate.
One surprising result was the lack of significance of percent black. At first glance, this appears to
fly in the face of a decade of research on this topic (e.g., Huk and Harwood 2019; Immergluck et
al. 2019; Medina et al. 2020; Merritt and Farnworth 2020; Taylor 2020; Lens et al. 2020; Nelson,
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Gromis, et al. 2021). This is not completely unprecedented: other studies on eviction have failed or
had ambiguous results in establishing a link to race (Greenberg, Gershenson, and Desmond 2016;
Desmond and Gershenson 2017; Goodspeed et al. 2021). And it should be noted that this study
does not attempt to look at individual causes for eviction, only factors on a neighborhood scale.
But if race is truly not a strong neighbor-level factor in South Carolina once other variables are
accounted for, what are the implications? Racial disparities in eviction are a fact (Desmond 2012),
validated by the correlational analysis. Perhaps the racialization of housing in South Carolina is
more systemic and generational than personal and immediate. Percent black did not exhibit as high
levels of multicollinearity as observed elsewhere, but this may manifest at the neighborhood level
in disproportionate poverty, poor-quality housing, and other forms of concentrated disadvantage.
(Goodspeed et al. 2021). Black tenants may face less individualized bigotry because they are more
likely to have a landlord of the same race compared to Hispanic tenants (Greenberg, Gershenson,
and Desmond 2016). In majority-minority neighborhoods, which are common in South Carolina,
racist landlords might be less motivated to evict black tenants, since they will expect black tenants
to replace them (Desmond and Gershenson 2017). These explanations, or others, require further
testing and elaboration before any can be accepted as fact. And if shown to be accurate for South
Carolina, they will not immediately be applicable to other states or regions without duplicating the
results there as well. As the following geographically weighted regression model confirms, the
explanations for eviction are highly variable across space.
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Geographically Weighted Regression
Eviction filing rates are a spatial phenomenon. The next part of this paper tries to improve our
understanding of eviction with a geographically weighted regression model (GWR). Because “there
is currently no consensus on how to assess confidence in the coefficients from a GWR model”
(Esri), I only used the variables found to be significant in the linear regression stage. The urban
dummy variable was excluded because dummy variables are not allowed in GWR. Using ArcGIS
Pro, static parameters were set as the Poisson distribution model (the same as for NBNR) and the
Gaussian definition of the kernel (i.e., the area used to optimize each local regression model). Using
a Gaussian kernel means that even tracts outside of the defined neighborhood will be given a slight
weight when optimizing the regression equation. This allows the model to look at small
neighborhood sizes (e.g., 20 tracts) while avoiding overfitting. The other parameters used to define
the size of the kernel were tweaked to minimize the AICc and multicollinearity, with the nearest
20 census tracts used in the final analysis.
In addition to generating the coefficient rasters, I wanted to test the hypothesis that the magnitude
of variables’ effects on the predicted eviction filing counts will vary spatially, the null hypothesis
being that these magnitudes will be constant or random. If the null is true, we should expect to see
the GWR be no more effective than linear regression at explaining the null deviance. If the GWR
model efficiently explains a significantly greater portion of the null deviance, the null hypothesis
will have to be rejected.
Comparing the GWR and non-spatial models, the results are somewhat ambiguous (Table 10, cf.
Table 8). On one hand, GWR is able to predict significantly more of the deviance, in fact, over 92
percent. But the AICc of the spatial model was more than three higher than that of the linear model,
indicating that these improvements were inefficient. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. It
remains to be shown whether a GWR model can efficiently improve on a global model.
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Table 10: Geographically Weighted Regression Model Results
Number of features
Deviance explained by the non-spatial model
Deviance explained by the spatial model
Deviance explained by the spatial vs non-spatial model
AICc
S2
S2 MLE
Effective degrees of freedom

1097
79.01%14
92.27%
0.6315
14229
4606
47816
11388

To test whether any major spatial variables had been missed by this model, a hot spot analysis and
spatial autocorrelation test were run on the residuals. The hot and cold spots visible in Figure 9
represent areas where the GWR model either over- or under-predicted the actual number of filings.
To improve the model, future research may want to examine these areas and the factors that may
have been missed there. But the low z score of the global Moran’s i means that the possibility that
these remaining clusters are due to spatial randomness cannot be ruled out (Table 11).
Table 11: Spatial Autocorrelation Report
Moran’s i

-0.0121

Z Score

-1.2779

P Value

0.2012

14

This is the value generated by ArcGIS. There is a slight discrepancy between it and the value reported for
NBNR in the previous section, probably due to slight differences in the ways R and ArcGIS fit the model.
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Figure 9: Hotspot Map of the GWR Deviance Residuals at 20 Nearest Neighbors

Although it cannot be proven to be the optimal model, GWR’s coefficient rasters still offer a unique
way to analyze how the causes of the eviction crisis vary between similarly vulnerable locations
(Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Geographically Weighted Regression Coefficient Raster Maps
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Percent Filed by LIHTC

Percent Filed by Public Housing

Total Renter Households

Density

Percent Population Hispanic

Percent Population Under 18

Percent Population 25+ with bachelor’s

Poverty Rate

Percent Low Income

Discussion
Some of the rasters simply confirm what was shown in the global model. Variables such as percent
population under 18 and total renter households had very consistent effects across the map. Other
rasters reveal patterns not visible in the global model but identified in other sections of this paper.
For example, the nonlinearity of median rent manifests spatially: in an area where rents are lower,
such as Spartanburg/Gaffney, rents are positively related to filings. In areas with higher rents, like
Myrtle Beach, the relationship is reversed. Cherokee County (home to Gaffney) stands out for the
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strong relationship between evictions by public housing and more filings overall, consistent with
the LHA’s startling proclivity to evict.
But the most important rasters are those that demonstrate unexpected or novel relationships. These
GWR coefficient rasters allow us to understand how housing markets are distinguished in terms of
what underlies their local eviction crises. For example, in contrast with Gaffney and Spartanburg,
the percent of evictions filed by public housing was actually negatively associated with overall
filings in North Charleston and Myrtle Beach. This suggests that housing authorities in these
locations may actually be sheltering their residents from eviction in the way that would be hoped
(or at least, they are less eviction prone than other forms of housing). LHA managers in Gaffney,
Spartanburg, or Florence might benefit from using the policies of North Charleston or Myrtle Beach
as a model for reforming their own.
Density is a more important positive factor in the Pee Dee than it is in other areas, suggesting a
sharper contrast between the crisis in cities and in rural areas. Given the downtown cold spots and
suburban hot spots observed in the hot spot analysis, one might expect the major metros to see this
relationship reversed. But in most of them, the effect of density is small. Only in Spartanburg and
Myrtle Beach is the relationship between density and filings clearly negative. The reasons for this
become clearer when examining a population density map of the major metros. Rather than a clear
peak in the downtown, these metros have population concentrations in the suburbs just as often,
centered around suburban apartments.
When compared with more general analyses of a local housing market, GWR rasters allow us to fit
eviction into that larger picture. For example, Beaufort County is clearly distinct from its
surroundings. Here, manufactured housing and subsidized housing are more strongly related to
filings than they are elsewhere. Educational attainment has an unusually high negative effect on
filings, while the number of renter households had shockingly little effect. These findings
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harmonize with what scholars have learned about the local housing market. Historically, the
predominantly black working-class has lived in low-density rural areas, often on heirs’ property,
and the affordable rental units that do exist are mostly manufactured housing or LIHTC (Finewood
2012; Dubose 2018; Grady 2019). Geographic isolation has historically made formal education a
particularly strong marker of class (DuBose 2018). Since the 1950s and 60s, development has
largely been oriented towards tourists and retirees seeking high levels of amenities, and many
wealthy neighborhoods have been built physically distant from working-class communities
(Finewood 2012; Dubose 2018). This, combined with high construction costs, has meant that any
affordable or subsidized housing is excluded from these census tracts (Grady 2019). Eviction is
less common in Beaufort (compared to the rest of the state) because the reproduction of the working
poor as a labor source is no longer as essential as it once was (Soederberg 2018; Finewood 2012).
Instead, capital seeks to use other tools of state power—rezoning, highway construction, and
appropriation of heirs’ property—to repurpose the land they live on (Finewood 2012).
This descriptive analysis shows how GWR rasters help us fit eviction into the local dynamics of a
housing market. By comparing GWR rasters to descriptions of the local housing market,
researchers, policymakers, and organizers can create similar analyses for any given geography.
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Limitations and Potential Improvements
As noted in the discussion of the GWR results, this study was not able to show this method to be
more efficient than nonspatial regression in terms of AICc. However, the amount of deviance
explained by the GWR model suggests that this is still a worthwhile area of exploration for future
research. By choosing slightly better independent variables, taking more aggressive measures to
reduce multicollinearity, and tweaking the definition of spatial relationships, I believe it will be
possible for future researchers to establish GWR as a superior method of accounting for spatial
variation in the model. As it stands, researchers can still utilize coefficient mapping to better
understand eviction within local housing markets.
There are also some important caveats regarding this study’s methodology. Researchers have
recently become more aware of the challenges causes by unreliable eviction data, and this study
was not immune to them (Porton, Desmond, and Gromis 2020). Court records limited me to using
eviction filings rather than counts of actual set-outs or involuntary displacement generally.
Moreover, I was not able to account for commercial or serial evictions because the court data
received did not contain defendant names. Ideally, because commercial evictions are not part of the
housing crisis, they should not be included in an analysis of residential evictions. Thankfully, they
make up less than 2 percent of eviction filings and therefore will have had little impact on the
overall findings (Porton, Desmond, and Gromis 2020; Desmond et al. 2016). The inclusion of serial
evictions is a more serious problem, because research has shown just how common that type of
eviction is in South Carolina (Porton, Desmond, and Gromis 2020). The final major limitation was
the inability to account for changes in property ownership. There were some apartments that
changed management during the study period (2015-2020), and this report did not attempt to
separate filings by earlier managers during the cleaning of property owner names. In future studies,
it would be ideal to develop a methodology that can consistently determine when property
management changes. However, the obvious source, deeds, usually only indicate ownership, not
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management. Newspaper records and apartment websites can offer details about management, but
these are less reliable, not universally available, and generally require painstaking manual searches
to find the desired information.
While conducting this analysis, I became aware that while my understanding of eviction was
grounded in the radical tradition, the methodology of my research itself was not consistent with
that worldview. While this thesis may contribute to the academic world’s understanding of the
geography of eviction, it is limited in its immediate usefulness to the tenants’ movement. It shares
more in common with research aimed towards policymakers, not activists. If we as researchers are
convinced that eviction is worth stopping, we must reorient ourselves away from birds-eye-views
like the one presented here and involve ourselves in the world of tenant organizing (Howell and
Teresa 2020). The Anti-Eviction Mapping Project is an inspiring example of the role that
researchers can play if they choose to do so (Maharawal and McElroy 2017). There is no shortage
of research to be done on landlords’ evolving eviction tactics and what tenants are doing the resist
them (Huq and Harwood 2019). In the latter respect, there is much that tenant organizers in the
United States could learn from those in the Global South (Miraftab 2006; Chiumbu 2012; Dekel
2020). Spreading the word about aggressive new strategies, embedding themselves within existing
tenants’ movements, and focusing as much on praxis as on theory—this is where the future of
eviction research must lie.
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Conclusion and the Path Forward
To conclude, I want to reflect on how the eviction crisis can be addressed. This thesis gives
examples of how an understanding of the eviction landscape in South Carolina can justify certain
policy interventions, but these are very limited in scope. Humanitarian reforms coming from
policymakers cannot eliminate eviction because landlords would not allow it. The interests of
landlords and the interests of tenants are not divergent, they are in fact oppositional (Marx 1976;
Brenner 1977). Landlords have a monopoly on land, meaning that as a group they have a right to
control who has access to land or housing (Marx 1976; Smith 1979). This gives them an incentive
to charge rent to anyone who wants to access land that the landlord is not currently using themselves
(Engels 2009; Soederberg 2018). But tenants, who lack land but still require shelter to survive, have
an interest in retaining as much of their income as possible. Each dollar the landlord manages to
extract in rent is a dollar they lose, and vice versa. Landlords are only able to enforce their
monopoly on land through coercive means, namely, eviction.
If eviction is not acceptable as a means, perhaps we need to evaluate rent extraction as an end. What
would the world look like without rent extraction? First of all, without the coercive power to
perpetuate the exploitation of tenants by landlords means that landlords will cease to exist
(Kropotkin 1906). Without the ability to extract rent, landlords will lose their right to extract rent.
With landlords and evictions gone, there would be three main challenges: maintaining housing,
building new housing, and securing individuals’ private access to their homes (Kropotkin 1906;
Ferreri and Vidal 2021). The question of maintenance is easy enough for detached dwellings—with
no more need to pay their landlords’ salaries, tenants will find it much easier to pay for the upkeep
of their own homes. For larger buildings, where many maintenance problems are shared, the
problem becomes trickier. Co-operatives and state subsidies are both possibilities, each with their
own issues (Horlitz 2013; Ferreri and Vidal 2021). Experimentation will ultimately be the best way
to find the right solution. In regards to who will finance new construction, the state is the most
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obvious candidate. At our current historical moment, it seems that only the state has the financial
power to build housing on the necessary scale (Ferreri and Vidal 2021). But this will run into issues
such as NIMBYism, resource segregation, and the domination of local governments by corporate
regimes. Here, we can turn the decades of literature on radical and participatory planning to show
us a path to a true democratization of housing (e.g., Arnstein 1969).
This radical solution to the eviction crisis is obviously not novel, but it is important to repeat it
here. Much of the recent wave of eviction literature—whether radical or not—has been primarily
aimed at policymakers or other researchers (cf., Sims 2016; Schmidt 2017; Soederberg 2018;
Summers 2019; Leung, Hepburn, and Desmond 2020). The former is subject to the many practical
constraints of public administration (Svara 1985), while the latter is already fully aware of what the
radical critique is. When solutions have been proposed, they are mostly limited in scope and
underwhelming in their objectives. If we desire to shift the scholarly focus towards explicitly
serving the tenants’ movement, it is necessary for our research to continually articulate an end goal.
We risk our credibility when we advocate changes that we know will not fix the problem.
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Figure 11: Filing Count by Independent Variable
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